The Politics of Terrorism: Power, Sympathy, and the Selective Application of Law

Few words in modern political discourse carry more weight — or ambiguity — than “terrorism.” It is at once a moral condemnation, a legal classification, and a justification for violence or repression. It is also, crucially, a political weapon, deployed selectively and often inconsistently. Despite dozens of international agreements and definitions, there remains no universally accepted legal standard for what constitutes terrorism — not because the concept is inherently elusive, but because the label itself is shaped by power.

At the heart of this inconsistency lies a dangerous double standard: the actions of non-state actors are readily condemned as terrorism, while functionally identical acts by recognized states are sanitized under terms like “military operation,” “reprisal,” or “collateral damage.” This is not merely semantic — it profoundly affects who is deemed legitimate, whose violence is accepted, and whose suffering is recognized.

The Palestinian struggle offers a clear and sustained illustration of this double standard. When Palestinians use violence — whether to resist occupation, reclaim land, or protest systemic disenfranchisement — it is almost universally labeled “terrorism” by dominant powers. When Israeli forces employ disproportionate force, bomb refugee camps, assassinate leaders abroad, or enable settler pogroms, the response is typically framed in the language of national security, not terrorism.

This essay argues that the application of the terrorism label is not primarily legal, but political. It reflects the interests and sympathies of powerful states, not the consistent application of legal norms. Moreover, it suggests that the Palestinian demand for equal treatment under international law mirrors the foundational struggle of the Enlightenment: the rejection of arbitrary privilege and the insistence that law must apply equally to all — individuals, peoples, and states alike.

UNGA Resolution 49/60 and the Legal Definition of Terrorism

Adopted in 1994, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/60 sought to define terrorism in a universal way. Its annexed Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism condemns:

“Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”

Crucially, the resolution does not distinguish between state and non-state actors in its definition. The criteria are clear: intentional violence against civilians designed to intimidate, coerce, or compel political outcomes constitutes terrorism. In principle, this could apply to any actor — state or otherwise.

In practice, however, the resolution has almost never been applied to state actions, even when they meet the definition precisely. The reason is not legal ambiguity. The reason is political reluctance to name and shame powerful states or their allies. When non-state actors engage in such behavior, the label “terrorism” is immediate and unyielding. When states do — especially recognized, militarily dominant, or geopolitically aligned states — the label is conspicuously absent.

State vs. Non-State: A Double Standard in Application

Numerous operations conducted by Israeli state forces — from the pre-state Haganah and Irgun to the modern IDF and Mossad — have involved the targeting of civilians, the use of collective punishment, and assassinations abroad. Under the strict criteria of UNGA 49/60, many of these actions fit the definition of terrorism:

• The Qibya massacre (1953): 69 Palestinian civilians killed, mostly women and children, as part of a punitive raid to “deter infiltration.”
• The Gaza campaigns (2008, 2014, 2021, 2023–25): Thousands of civilians killed, UN schools and hospitals bombed, food and water blockades imposed — often justified as counter-terrorism, despite their impact being indistinguishable from acts meant to intimidate an entire population.
• The Wrath of God assassinations (1970s): Car bombs and mail bombs used to kill suspected militants — and, in some cases, civilians — across Europe and the Middle East.
• The enabling of settler violence: From pogroms in towns like Huwara to systemic attacks on Palestinian farmers and children, settler violence is regularly met with military protection or indifference, effectively sanctioning it as an arm of state policy.

None of these actions are ever described as “terrorism” by the international community — not even by the UN itself. The language used is that of “retaliation,” “security,” or “military necessity.” At most, such actions are classified as violations of international humanitarian law, which are treated as war crimes or breaches of proportionality — not terrorism.

Palestinian Violence and the Universality of the Label

By contrast, Palestinian violence — even when directed at military targets or framed as resistance — is universally labeled terrorism. From suicide bombings during the Second Intifada to rocket fire from Gaza, the label is immediate and absolute. Even non-violent resistance by Palestinians — such as the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement — is sometimes criminalized or equated with “terrorist support” by some states.

The asymmetry is clear: Palestinians are judged by their outcomes, regardless of context. Israel is judged by its intentions, regardless of outcomes.

The Role of Recognition, Sympathy, and Power

This discrepancy arises from a core political fact: the terrorism label is not applied by legal bodies in isolation, but by powerful states, media institutions, and international organizations influenced by strategic alliances and political sympathies.

• State recognition confers legitimacy. Israel, as a recognized state, is seen as possessing the sovereign right to use force. Palestinians, lacking full recognition and statehood, are seen as illegitimate actors — even when they invoke rights under international law (e.g., the right to resist occupation under UN Resolution 37/43).
• Political sympathy matters. In the West, Israel is perceived as a democracy, a regional ally, a bulwark against extremism. This creates an implicit presumption of good faith. Palestinians are associated with Islamism, authoritarianism, or terrorism — creating a presumption of bad faith. These sympathies shape not just media framing, but also legal and diplomatic language.
• Power shields from judgment. States with veto power at the UN, strong military alliances (e.g., with the U.S.), or economic influence are rarely subject to international prosecution or labeling. This is why terrorism, like war crimes, is often punished only when committed by the weak.

The Palestinian Struggle and the Enlightenment Ideal

At its core, the Palestinian demand is not only for land, sovereignty, or recognition — it is a demand for equal application of the law. It is the demand that the same principles applied to others be applied to them — whether in the right to resist, the right to life, or the right to justice.

In this sense, the Palestinian struggle mirrors the foundational struggles of the Enlightenment. Just as 18th-century thinkers rejected the divine right of kings — the notion that some rulers are above the law by virtue of birth or title — Palestinians today reject the immunity of states from legal accountability.

Enlightenment thinkers like Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Kant argued that law must apply to all equally, or it is not law but tyranny. They argued that sovereignty lies with the people, not with rulers who claim it by fiat. Palestinians, too, argue that statehood should not determine who is humanized, who is criminalized, or whose suffering matters.

To label one bombing as terrorism and another as security — despite identical means and aims — is to reinstate the logic of aristocracy: that some lives are sacred, and others expendable. That some people have the right to resist, and others only the right to suffer.

The demand for consistent law — whether in applying the Geneva Conventions, prosecuting war crimes, or defining terrorism — is a demand not only for justice, but for modernity itself.

Conclusion: Toward a Universal Standard

If terrorism is to be more than a political slur — if it is to be a meaningful legal category — then it must be applied consistently. This means:

• Recognizing that state actors can commit terrorism, just as non-state actors can.
• Acknowledging that civilian targeting to achieve political aims is terrorism, regardless of the actor’s flag, religion, or strategic value.
• Applying legal definitions like UNGA 49/60 to actions, not actors.

Failure to do so does not only perpetuate injustice — it undermines the very idea of international law. It tells the world that law is not universal, but a weapon of the powerful. It tells the oppressed that their only crime is weakness.

The Palestinian call for equal rights, equal protection, and equal judgment under the law is not a radical demand — it is the very essence of the Enlightenment, and the measure of any civilization that claims to honor it.

Annex: Incidents Meeting the Strict Literal Definition of Terrorism under UNGA Resolution 49/60

Applied without the customary exclusion of state or state-supported actors.

A. Massacres (deliberate large-scale killing of civilians to terrorise and compel flight or submission)

B. Targeted Assassinations / Extrajudicial Killings with Terror Intent

C. Settler Violence (non-state actors with frequent state impunity)

These 32 incidents (18 massacres, 4 assassinations, 20 settler attacks) unambiguously satisfy every element of UNGA Resolution 49/60 when the definition is applied literally and without the political exemption normally granted to state or state-protected actors. They collectively caused thousands of civilian deaths and were intended — as admitted by perpetrators, commanders, or subsequent Israeli inquiries — to provoke terror, intimidate populations, or compel political/territorial outcomes.